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Typical corporate finance folklore tells us that existing proportionate priority and absolute 
priority rules in bankruptcy have evolved in order to eliminate inefficiencies that result 
when lenders rush to retrieve their assets from a fm in financial distress. This paper 
shows that when a fm is faced with a moral hazard problem, first-come, first served rules 
reduce lenders' incentives to free ride on the monitoring efforts of each other.  As a result, 
these rules may reduce the total social cost of loan contracts compared to other 
bankruptcy rules.  The bankruptcy rules described here mimic important contractual 
arrangements found in real-world debt contracts. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmStandard arguments in corporate finance tell us that existing bankruptcy rules have evolved to 
eliminate inefficiencies that result when lenders rush to retrieve their assets from a firm under financial 
distress.  Thus, both  Chapter 7 and  Chapter 1  1 bankruptcy proceedings ostensibly maintain absolute 
priority among creditor groups and provide for assets to be divided proportionately among creditors of 
equal priority.  This rationale, however, may not always be valid.  Moral hazard problems relating to the 
choice of project may make the act of "running"  on a firm desirable, since it can help align investment 
incentives. 
This paper looks at the problem of an entrepreneur who must raise outside funds to finance one 
of  two investment alternatives.  One of  these projects is risky, so that any interest rate which ensures 
lenders their reservation return causes the entrepreneur to earn negative profits.  Nevertheless, the firm is 
unable to  commit to the less risky project, so neither can be undertaken. 
First-come, first-served (FCFS)  rules, often  considered a benchmark  in  the  absence of  other 
bankruptcy rules, serve to diminish this moral hazard problem.  We derive a mixed-strategy equilibrium 
in which lenders monitor the firm with some positive probability.  When the firm is caught investing in 
the risky project, it is liquidated; otherwise, it is allowed to continue.  Although an equilibrium may exist 
under both FCFS rules and proportionate priority rules (PPRs), we demonstrate that it is less likely to exist 
under PPRs, and that when it does, the FCFS equilibrium is Pareto superior.  Furthermore, FCFS rules 
continue to dominate even when lenders are able to appoint a delegated monitor and provide that monitor 
with absolute seniority (absolute priority rules, or APRs). 
The fact that lenders can run on the firm when they observe that it has chosen the risky project 
helps keep the firm honest.  The FCFS aspect of asset distribution keeps lenders from wanting to free ride 
on the monitoring efforts of others -  those lenders who monitor are first in line to receive their claim 
on the firm's assets and are thus likely to be paid in full.  Lenders who wait to observe the monitoring 
of others are less  likely to receive anything if  the firm  goes under.  This process is much  like that 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmdescribed in the banking papers of Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Calomiris, Kahn, and Krasa (1991), 
where demandable debt is used to control the banker's moral hazard problem, while sequential service 
prevents depositors from free riding on the monitoring efforts of others. 
The bankruptcy rules we describe mimic many important contractual arrangements found in real- 
world debt contracts.  A trade creditor might refuse to ship new supplies to a firm when its prospects look 
bad, effectively refusing to renew its loan.  Alternatively, a factoring company might decide to no longer 
guarantee payments for new accounts receivable generated with that firm.  Also, a bank has the right to 
seize a borrower's  assets under the bank's control when it discovers that the borrower is in default.  In 
each  case,  the  action  taken  by  one  creditor  sends  a  signal  to  the  rest  of  the  market  as  to  the 
creditworthiness of the borrower, thereby forcing a poor borrower into bankruptcy.  As  such, the act of 
monitoring acquires a public-good aspect.  Like all public goods, too little monitoring will occur unless 
the provider can capture and exclude others from its benefits.  FCFS rules, and other contracts containing 
their features, serve to compensate monitors for their actions. 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are often criticized by  both legal and economic scholars for 
the violation of absolute priority that often results.'  Our findings suggest that such violations may in fact 
increase social welfare.  By refusing to reward senior lenders who fail to monitor the debtor, Chapter 11 
strengthens the monitoring incentive:  Lenders who wish to obtain the full value of their claims in default 
must obtain their assets before a bankruptcy petition is filed.' 
The key idea here is that bankruptcy institutions should reward monitors when and only when they 
' See, for example, Jackson (1986), Jensen (1991), and Gemer and Scharfstein (1991). 
Several recent papers emphasize a similar point -  that absolute priority violations may  be welfare improving. 
Harris and Raviv (1993) show that a banlcruptcy court that mandates violations of absolute priority in some states 
of the  world can  be  part of an  optimal financial contract.  Eberhart and Senbet (1993) argue that  APR  violations 
ameliorate the asset substitution problem when fums are financially distressed, precisely when other incentive control 
mechanisms like convertible bonds are ineffective. Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) provide evidence that 
APR  violations are anticipated ex ante. 
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analyze how the choice of different priority and term structures in loan contracts affects the incentives of 
lenders to monitor the firm.  They argue that informational conditions determine which structures provide 
the best monitoring incentives, meaning that the firm's capital structure can be used to achieve outcomes 
that are not directly contractible.  In other words, ex ante efficiency is improved by  choosing a capital 
structure that properly rewards monitors. 
In addition, our model implies that the preference section of the bankruptcy code should be used 
with extreme discretion.  Preference law, as it relates our problem, is designed to prevent claimants from 
opting out of the collective proceeding by nullifying payments made to some creditors immediately prior 
to the bankruptcy filing.3  Our results suggest that such actions by  a bankruptcy judge  would in fact 
reduce the incentive to monitor, lowering social welfare. 
The next  section summarizes traditional bankruptcy analyses.  Here we  outline some of  the 
standard arguments that an alternative to FCFS rules in bankruptcy law is needed, and question whether 
these arguments are valid in all circumstances.  We then use this background to analyze other studies of 
bankruptcy.  In section 11, we introduce our model and show that under certain conditions, a firm may be 
unable to obtain financing because it cannot commit ex ante to a low-risk project; possible solutions to 
this problem are analyzed.  In particular, we show that a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists in which the 
firm is able to find lenders.  Section I11  looks at the effect different bankruptcy rules may have on the 
equilibrium of this game.  We show that PPRs reduce the incentive of  lenders to monitor the firm, thus 
raising the social cost of these contracts.  Section IV extends the model to allow lenders to designate a 
monitor.  As before, PPRs undercompensate the designated monitor (called a bank) for its services, leading 
to a less efficient outcome than do FCFS rules.  We then show that strict seniority for the designated 
monitor is also Pareto inferior, since it overcompensates the monitor.  We  conclude in section V by 
See Jackson (1986), chapter 6. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexamining features of standard loan contracts that look much like the FCFS rules of our model.  We also 
examine two  recent  examples of  these rules in action.  Finally, we  discuss the theoretical and policy 
implications of our model and propose some possible extensions to our results.  Several of the proofs are 
relegated to the appendix. 
Section I - Justifications for PPRs 
Most discussions of bankruptcy institutions start with the assumption that a formal procedure for 
distributing the assets of an insolvent firm is needed, and then focus on the specific form such a procedure 
should take.  But it is not clear that this assumption is valid in all cases.  To see this, consider some of 
its standard justifications. 
In the absence of bankruptcy laws, assets are distributed to creditors in the order in which they 
have staked their claims.  Thus, the first lender to  request  repayment is, generally, the first to receive 
payment.  Lenders who end up last in line are paid last and quite possibly receive nothing.  For this 
reason, these default bankruptcy proceedings are typically called FCFS rules. 
Traditional rationales for a more orderly mechanism cite several potential problems with FCFS 
rules.  First, lenders may wish to protect their position by expending excessive resources monitoring the 
firm's condition.  If  a lender does not do this, the argument goes, he will certainly be the last to know 
when the firm is about to default, and thereby be last in line to collect his claim.  Furthermore, since all 
lenders are engaged in this monitoring, no one will get a more preferable place in line than he would if 
none of them monitored, so these resources are spent in vain.  This game looks much like the classic 
prisoners' dilemma, in which the Pareto superior outcome with no monitoring is not a Nash equilibrium. 
It is argued that an orderly bankruptcy procedure allows lenders to avoid these costs, making all of them 
better off. 
A second argument against FCFS rules is the classic "common pool" problem.  Here it is claimed 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthat in their rush to be paid, lenders might reduce the total liquidation value of the firm by  separating 
assets that would be more valuable together.  An orderly liquidation, on the other hand, would ensure that 
the firm's assets are put to their most productive uses, maximizing their value to the creditors.  Worse yet, 
lenders might actually run too soon and foreclose on illiquid but otherwise viable firms.  Here again, 
formal bankruptcy rules should help prevent these inefficient liquidations. 
Jackson (1986), p.  10, summarizes the intuition behind these arguments: "The basic problem that 
bankruptcy law is designed to handle ... is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be bad for 
the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go around." 
With these (often implicit) assumptions, modem examinations of bankruptcy rules investigate what 
form  formal  liquidation  rules  should  take.  For  example, many  authors have  looked at  the  relative 
efficiency of  APRs  (where the order of  repayment is determined ex ante by  assigning each lender a 
priority level) and PPRS.~  Under various assumptions, they all conclude that these rules are inefficient 
in  regard  to  both  the  liquidation/continuation decision  and  the  decision  to  make  new  investments. 
Numerous other studies look directly at the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code and show that, in general, it does 
not provide efficient investment or liquidation incentives 
But none of these studies examines the relative efficiency of various bankruptcy rules compared 
to the natural default -  FCFS rules.  We believe that a formal examination of  the efficiency of FCFS 
rules is a necessary starting place for analyses of bankruptcy. 
In addition, most models analyze the effects of bankruptcy ex post.  They begin with a firm having 
some existing capital structure that is unable to meet its current debt obligations. The focus is on whether 
See, for example, Bulow and  Shoven (1978), White (1980, 1983), and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991). 
Detragiache (1991) and Gertner and  Scharfstein (1991) are two among  many  examples. 
For further information on  bankruptcy and financial distress and their impact on  incentives, see Aghion  and 
Bolton (1992), Berkovitch and Israel (1991), Berkovitch and Kim (1990), Berlin and Mester (1992), Hart and Moore 
(1989), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977). 
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the firm is insolvent, and will extend new credit to  the firm for and only for positive net present value 
projects.  Whether  bankruptcy  rules  provide  for decisions that  are  efficient ex  post  is  certainly an 
interesting question.  But debt contracts are designed to resolve ex ante uncertainty, and their efficiency 
must therefore be measured from the viewpoint of the initial contracting problem.  Indeed, most of  the 
literature on asymmetric information accepts ex post inefficiency in some states of the world in order to 
achieve an outcome that is ex ante Pareto optimal.  The proper question, then, is how different bankruptcy 
rules affect the social cost of debt contracts at the time in which they are written. 
Boyes, Faith, and Wrase (1991) is one of  few papers to  address both  of  these issues.  They 
compare the ex ante social cost of debt contracts under PPRs and FCFS rules and conclude that the PPRs 
found in Chapter 7 are more efficient than FCFS rules, since they reduce the cost of contracting.  Their 
result depends upon the assumption that rushing to liquidate the firm is costly, whereas formal bankruptcy 
proceedings are not.  In a FCFS world, lenders must pay to enter a queue to obtain the firm's assets.  If 
they allow a firm to continue despite the fact that its expected return is negative, they will avoid these 
queuing costs some of the time (when the firm does well).  Thus, lenders have an incentive to allow some 
firms with negative net present value to continue? 
Their model differs from ours in several important respects.  First, they assume that FCFS rules 
are more costly to implement than are PPRs.  As a result, this model simply shows that the more costly 
course of action is the less efficient one.'  More important, in our model the firm chooses between two 
different investment projects.  This choice is the private information of the firm, creating a moral hazard 
They also acknowledge that FCFS rules may result in  inefficient liquidations of fms  that have a positive net 
present value, and claim that this gives further support to their argument that PPRs  are more efficient. They ignore, 
however, the possibility that these two effects may  offset each other, reducing the net inefficiency of FCFS  rules. 
If they  were to assume that both types of rules entailed the same costs, their model would indicate that FCFS 
rules are preferred, since they involve these costs only a fraction of the time, whereas PPRs  always do. 
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on the monitoring efforts of each other.  We propose that FCFS rules can serve to ameliorate this problem. 
Some of  our conclusions resemble those of Diamond (1992), who finds that when a firm cannot 
negotiate with its long-term (public) lenders, short-term (bank) lenders should be made junior, to reduce 
their incentive to liquidate the firm  early.9  His model differs from ours, however, in several important 
respects.  His  is an  adverse selection model, and the  monitoring that occurs in the  interim phase is 
costless.  In addition, it is a noisy signal of the firm's true type.  More important, efficiency in his model 
depends upon the proper continuation/liquidation decision in the interim period.  In other words, he looks 
at ex post rather than ex ante efficiency. 
Section I1 - The Model 
Consider a three-period model  with  a risk-neutral firm.  In  the  first period, the firm  has  the 
opportunity to invest in  only one of two projects, each of which has a random  return in period three.'' 
Denote these projects G and B to coincide with their respective distribution functions."  Assume that 
both projects have the same mean, but that project G is second-order stochastic dominant over B, i.e, that 
See also Diamond (1990a, 1990b, 1991). 
'O Alternatively, we  could assume that the owner of the fm must choose one of two levels of  effort. 
I'  Unless otherwise stated, we  will assume in what follows that both distributions have the same support, [x,  F]  . 
This assumption is for notational simplicity and is not  necessary, since we  assume that project revenues cannot be 
observed by  lenders outside of default.  If  they  could be observed and the projects had  different supports, then  it 
would  be  possible to ensure efficient investment by writing contracts that impose large penalties on  the fm  when 
outcomes that could not have resulted from  the designated project are observed. 
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in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970).13 Furthermore, the choice of project and the resulting revenue 
in period three are costlessly observable only by the firm.  Outsiders may discover the choice of project 
in period two only by paying a cost, c.  The results of this monitoring provide a perfect signal of  the 
firm's choice of project. 
Both projects require L dollars to undertake.  Because the firm has no resources of its own, it must 
raise external financing.  Equity is out of the question, since the revenue from these projects cannot be 
publicly ~bserved.'~.'~  Consequently, the firm must borrow this initial investment.  We will assume that 
the loan market is composed of a large number of identical risk-neutral agents, each with an endowment 
of Lln.  This endowment may be either loaned to the firm or invested in a riskless technology with  a 
return of  1.  In equilibrium, competition will always drive down the interest rate to ensure that all lenders 
l2 The fact that the two projects have equal means implies that, in the absence of  transaction costs, both projects 
would be useful.  However, our informational asymmetry makes project B less socially desirable, since it has higher 
expected banlauptcy costs. 
This condition is not necessary for the conclusions that follow, but it simplifies the proof of  Proposition 2. 
This proposition will still hold  if  project G has a higher mean  than does project B, provided that the spread is not 
too large.  Thus, all our results would  still hold  even if  project B were a negative net present value project. 
l3 For a good introduction to the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of  increasing risk, see Laffont (1989). 
l4 Here we  are appealing to the classic costly state verification model of Townsend (1979).  More recently, Gale 
and Hellwig (1985), Boyd and Smith (1993a), Dionne and  Viala (1992), Krasa and  Villamil  (1994), and  Winton 
(1992) have demonstrated the general robustness of this result.  Of  particular interest are Boyd and Smith and Dionne 
and Viala, both  of  whose models are similar to our own.  Boyd  and Smith complicate the costly state verification 
story by  introducing adverse selection (in order to  study credit rationing), whereas we  focus on  a mod hazard 
problem.  Dionne and Viala use  costly effort (as opposed to  second-order stochastic dominance) to  introduce the 
moral hazard problem. 
Note that the monitoring we  discuss below is distinct from  the state verification of  these models.  In  our 
context, monitoring is an  action that takes place before the outcome of  the project is determined; state verification 
occurs after the project's return is realized. 
l5 Recent extensions to the costly state verification literature indicate that stochastic verification may  dominate 
the deterministic verification assumed here.  Since the declaration of  bankruptcy seems to occur deterministically 
in real life, we  are not too  uncomfortable ruling out randomization at this stage of  the game.  In  addition, we  are 
comforted by  the results of  Boyd  and Smith (1993b), who conclude that the relative size of any welfare loss from 
this resmction is small and that incentive problems associated with randomization schemes may very well make them 
suboptimal. 
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11  Period 1  I  Period 2  I  Period 3  11 
Loans Made 
Project Selected 
Figure 1 - Sequence of Events 
Short-Term Debt Due 
Monitoring Occurs 
Long-Term Debt 
Long-Term Debt Due 
Project Matures 
To finance either of these "long-term" projects, the firm could issue long-term debt -  that is, debt 
that comes due in period  three.  If  the firm commits to invest in a particular project,  any prospective 
lender will demand a default premium commensurate with that project's  anticipated risk.  Let x be  the 
project's  realized value.  If  r is the promised interest rate, then the firm must default if  x < rL. The 
liquidation proceedings that follow default, or state verification, cost d(rL -x), where d  is some positive 
constant.  Thus, the dead-weight cost of default depends upon its magnitude and is equal to zero when 
the firm can just pay its debts.16 
If the firm chooses to invest in project G, each lender's expected return is 
Setting this expression equal to zero gives us an equation which implicitly determines the zero-profit 
interest rate for this project,  r,.  On the other hand, if the firm chooses project B, each lender's expected 
l6 More generally, we  could assume that  d(.) is some arbitrary function of  the size of  default rL  -x.  In  this 
case, the restriction in  Proposition  1 would  be that  dl(.) be  sufficiently small -  i.e.,  that the cost of  default not 
rise too steeply as its magnitude increases.  All  of  our results would  follow using this generalization. 
We  will  also assume  that  d(rL -9 I  x so  we  can  ignore outcomes  where  the  project's  returns  are 
insufficient to pay  the default costs.  This does not affect our results and simplifies the analysis.  Alternatively, we 
could assume that when  default occurs, the lender must pay  these costs even if they  exceed the revenue from  the 
project. 
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which implies a zero-profit interest rate  r,  .I7  It is straightforward to show: 
PROPOSITION  1:  Ifproject B is more risky than project G (in the sense of  Rothschild-Stiglitz), and  if d 
is suficiently small, then r, > r,. 
Proof:  See appendix. 
One might be surprised that this proposition depends upon d being small -  we would expect that 
an increase in the interest rate should unambiguously raise the lender's expected return.  However, this 
increase might cause the borrower to default more often, thereby decreasing the lender's return.  Stiglitz 
and  Weiss  (1981) show that this effect can lead to credit rationing.''  Our restriction on d  is  a mild 
technical assumption to ensure that this problem will not arise. 
The firm's expected profit from projects G and B is 
and 
An example may make the results that follow more clear.  Suppose that the support of  G and B is  { 1,2,3 ] , 
with g(1) = g(3) = .0001, g(2)  = .9998, b(1)  = b(3)  = .4999, and b(2)  = .0002. Clearly, these two distributions 
have the same mean, and B is more risky in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz.  Let c  = .001, d  = .5, n  = 10, and 
L  = 1.5.  Setting (2.2) and (2.3) each equal to  zero and substituting in these parameters allows us  to calculate 
r,  = 1.00005 and r,  = 2.0. 
'' Our  moral hazard story is equivalent to what  Stiglitz and Weiss call the ."the  interest rate as an  incentive 
mechanism."  See also Longhofer (1994). 
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Since project B is successful less frequently than is project G, given any d the expected cost of 
default will be higher under project B.  If the chance of default is sufficiently high, debt financing will 
be too expensive and the firm will forgo the project (recall that the firm may undertake only one of the 
two projects).  We will assume that the good project is safe enough to ensure that (2.4) is positive, while 
the bad project is so risky that (2.5) is non-positive (i.e., that rBL  > 3.  In other words, r, is so high that 
the firm is unable to make positive expected profits.'920 Nevertheless, it is easy to show: 
PRoPosITIoN 2:  Ifproject B is more risky than project G (in  the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz), then given 
any promised payment, the jirm  will always prefer project  B." 
Proof:  See appendix.  - 
This proposition implies that long-term debt prevents the firm from credibly promising to invest 
in the less risky project.  Once it receives the (relatively low) interest rate associated with G, it would like 
to go ahead and invest in B, since it suffers none of the losses associated with the increased variability 
of the project.  If long-term debt is the only option, no lender will accept any interest rate below  r,,  and 
l9 Since project B has the same expected return as project G under full information, this implies that debt creates 
an underinvestment problem.  This is not a necessary feature of  the model.  AU of  our results can be proved under 
the assumption that B is a negative net present value project, eliminating this implied inefficiency. 
20 In  our example started in  footnote 17, the fm's expected profit from  project  G is  .499975, whereas its 
expected profit would be zero if  it were to  undertake project B. 
This proposition is verified by  our example:  If  the fm were unconditionally offered the good interest rate 
(rg  = 1.00005), its expected profit  from  selecting the  bad  project  would  be  .749912, which  is higher  than  the 
expected return from selecting the good project. 
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This inability of the firm to commit to the less risky project obviously entails social costs.  Since 
r,  ensures that lenders make zero profits, the total cost to society is measured by  the profits the firm 
would make under project G, given by  expression (2.4): 
S  hort-Term Debt 
Is it possible to avoid this cost?  One solution to this moral hazard problem is a maturity mismatch 
with short-term debt?2  Suppose the firm must make a payment to its lenders in period two.  Since the 
firm has no revenues until period three, it must either default or convince the lenders to roll over its debt. 
Prior to renewing the debt, however, lenders can monitor the firm and determine which project has been 
selected.  We will assume that potential lenders are diverse and uncoordinated and thus unable to decide 
ex ante who should perform the m~nitoring?~  To analyze this situation, we will assume that each lender 
has equal priority and look for a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
When the firm receives its financing in period one, it decides how often it will invest in each of 
the two projects.  Let .rr:  E  [O, 11  be the probability that project B is selected.  In period two, lenders must 
decide how often they will monitor the firm, i.e., pick a monitoring probability a E  [O,]].  Since we are 
looking for a symmetric equilibrium, the total probability that the firm is monitored is  1  -(1 -a)". 
Conditional on the result of his own monitoring (if it occurs), each lender can then decide whether 
22 Dionne and  Viala (1992) also note that  short-term debt can  be  used  to  ameliorate moral  hazard problems. 
However, they  assume that  the  action  selected by  the  agent  (or  in our case, the project selected  by the fm) is 
costlessly observable. 
23  In section IV,  we  show  that our results remain essentially unchanged  even  when  all  monitoring tasks are 
delegated to  one lender. 
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to  demand repayment, the firm is liquidated unless it can obtain alternative financing to pay off its old 
debt. 
Let z be the (post-bankruptcy cost) period-two liquidation value of the firm.  We assume that 
z  < L, so that this value is insufficient to pay off all of the firm's debts.  Lenders who monitor are the 
first in line for the firm's assets when it is liquidated, since they are the first to be aware that the firm has 
cheated.  Thus, under FCFS rules, the firm's assets, z,  are first divided among the monitors, with non- 
monitors receiving a share only after all monitors' claims are paid in full.  If instead PPRs are in effect, 
the  liquidation value of  the  firm is divided equally among  all  creditors, regardless of  whether they 
monitored. 
Finally, if the firm is not liquidated in period two, its project matures and revenues are received 
in period three.  If the firm is able to pay off all lenders, it keeps the balance; otherwise, it is liquidated 
and its residual value is divided equally among the creditors." 
Derivation of an Equilibrium 
We now look for a symmetric equilibrium.  In equilibrium, the probability of monitoring, a,  must 
make the firm indifferent between choosing project G and project B: 
-  - 
Imax  (x-rl, 0)  dG(x)  = (1 -a)"lmax (x-rl, 0)  dB@). 
The return to each lender will depend upon the number of  other lenders who monitor.  Let M(w) 
denote the probability  that w of the other lenders monitor the firm in period  two.  Clearly, w has  a 
binomial distribution so that 
24 Note that in period three, no lender has advance information that the fm will default.  Thus, all  lenders have 
equal priority in  this period.  We show in section V that strict priority rules which  govern the distribution of  assets 
both in this period and  in period 2 are inefficient. 
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L  (1-7~)  RG(r) + ncl(r) - c - -,  (2.8) 
n 
where 
is the lender's expected return when the firm  chooses project G, and  5, is the expected return to a lender 
who monitors when the firm  "cheats."  Under PPRs, this is just the period-two liquidation value of  the 
firm divided by the number of lenders, so: 
With FCFS rules, this return depends upon the number of other lenders with whom the liquidation value 
of the firm must be shared.  If z is large enough, each lender receives Lln, the principal value of the loan. 
Otherwise, the monitoring lenders divide z equally among themselves.  This gives us 
n-1 
c"  =  M(W)  min {L,  L}. 
W-O  w+1  n 
On the other hand, the expected return to a lender who does not monitor is 
where R,(r)  is defined like R,(r), and 5, is the expected return to a non-monitoring lender when the firm 
is liquidated in period two.  Under PPRs, 
while under FCFS rules, 
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firm chooses project G.  If the firm instead chooses project B, the lender's expected return depends upon 
the monitoring decisions of the other lenders. If none of them monitor, then all lenders roll over their debt 
and the firm continues until period three, giving us the second term.  Finally, if  at least one of the other 
lenders monitors the firm, it is liquidated, and lenders who  don't  monitor expect to receive the third 
expression. 
Define as  as the solution to (2.6),  and  ns  and  rs to be  the probability of  monitoring and the 
interest rate that simultaneously solve (2.8) and  (2.12) equal  to zero.  Then we  have the  following 
characterization of equilibrium: 
PROPOSITION  3:  When the period-two  liquidation value of the firm, z,  is suficiently large, the following 
strategies constitute a mhed-strategy Nash equilibrium with short-term debt: 
(1) The firm  chooses project B with probability  ns  ,  and project  G with 
probability  (1  -ns)  ; 
(2) Lenders choose to monitor with probability  as,  and refuse to renew 
their loans only when they observe project  B; and 
(3) All  outsiders  assume  that  the firm  has  chosen  project  B  with 
probability  one whenever it seeks new financing  in period  two. 
Proof:  See appendix. 
An examination of the proof of Proposition 3 provides some intuition on the required lower bound 
on the period-two liquidation value of the firm:  z must be larger than the sum of lenders' expected returns 
from  allowing a "bad"  firm  to  continue.  That is, if  lenders  as a group expect to receive more from 
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is a natural parametric restri~tion.~~ 
In the next section, we show that this contract is less likely to exist under PPRs than it is under 
FCFS rules, and that when it does exist, it is more costly to implement. 
Section I11  - Existence and Efficiency of  Equilibrium 
The equilibrium developed in the previous section was derived in a manner consistent with both 
FCFS rules and PPRs.  Our goal in this section is to show that 1) equilibrium is less likely to occur under 
PPRs, and 2)  when it does exist, the total social cost of the contract will be higher under PPRs.  We do 
this by examining the interest rate in this problem under each of  these rules. 
In order for equilibrium to exist, as must solve (2.6): 
and  .ns and  rs must solve both 
and 
L  (1  -.n)  R,(r)  + .n (1  -a)"-'  R,(r)  + .n&(r)  - - =  0 . 
n 
(3.3) 
In addition, the following conditions must be satisfied:  0 I as I  1, 0 I  .ns  I  1,  and  1  I  rs I  ?/L.26 
25 The lower bound on z is more stringent under PPRs than it is under FCFS rules, implying that this equilibrium 
exists for a smaller range of parameter values under PPRs (z can be smaller under FCFS rules).  This reinforces our 
claim that FCFS rules dominate PPRs (see section 111). 
26 Proposition 2 implies that  as  is always positive.  Moreover, it will be  less than one whenever project G is 
profitable for the fm. 
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Proof:  See appendix. 
The intuition behind Theorem  1 is straightforward and is illustrated in figure 2.  Let x, be the 
locus of  (x, r)  pairs that solve (3.2) and 7c, be the locus solving (3.3).  The left-most intersection of these 
loci is our equilibriu~n.~~ 
Figure 2 
When the firm is caught investing in project B, FCFS rules give more to lenders who monitor than 
do PPRs.  Thus,  is everywhere above xy.  Similarly, when the firm is caught cheating, lenders 
who don't monitor receive less under FCFS rules than they do under PPRs:  PPRs allow lenders to free 
27  Since any such intersection provides lenders with  zero expected profit, the equilibrium is the one that results 
in  the lowest possible interest rate for the borrower, i.e., the left-most intersection. 
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first intersection of these two curves under PPRs must be to the right of the first intersection under FCFS 
rules, so the equilibrium under FCFS rules must entail a lower interest rate?8 
It is immediately clear that equilibrium is less likely to exist under PPRs: 
COROLLARY:  Existence of  an equilibrium is less likely under PPRs than it is under FCFS  rules. 
Proof:  For the less risky project to be feasible, the total payment made by the firm, rsL,  must be less than 
7,  the project's largest possible o~tcome?~  As r increases, this condition is less likely to be satisfied.  4 
Basically, the shifts in  n,  and  7c,  due to the change in bankruptcy rules make an intersection 
between them less likely to occur within our relevant range.  As  shown in figure 2, Y/L  is the highest 
value the interest rate can take and still allow the firm to make non-negative profits.  Since 71:y  and 
first intersect at an  interest rate  higher than  YIL, an equilibrium does not exist under PPRs (in this 
example). 
Also  note  that Proposition  3  implies  equilibrium  is  less  likely  to  exist  under  PPRs.  That 
proposition  required that the period-two  liquidation value of  the firm exceed the sum  of  the lenders' 
expected returns from allowing project B to mature.  Under FCFS rules, this critical z is smaller than it 
Let us  again  turn  to the example that we  started in  foomote 17.  If we  assume  z  = 1.4, direct calculation 
verifies that when  FCFS rules are in  effect the interest rate is 1.00695, while under PPRs it is 1.01092. 
29 Strictly speaking, this  bound  may  be  even  lower.  If  d is sufficiently large, credit rationing will  appear, 
reducing the maximal feasible interest rate.  In  this case, however, it is the lenders who  will refuse to participate. 
See Longhofer (1994) for a more detailed examination of  this type of  credit rationing. 
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PPRs.~' 
Even when an equilibrium does exist under both types of bankruptcy proceedings, we can show 
that the equilibrium under FCFS rules Pareto dominates that arising under PPRs.~~ 
THEOREM  2:  Total surplus is larger under FCFS rules than under PPRs. 
Proof:  Since lenders make zero profits under both procedures, total surplus is measured by the firm's  - 
expected profits: 
When  rs changes, (2.6) implies that as adjusts so as to keep: 
X  X  -  - 
As a result, any change in nS  is irrelevant -  it merely changes the relative weights placed on two equal 
quantities.  But increases in the interest rate lower both terms in (3.4) because: 
Since rs is higher under PPRs, firm profits must be higher under FCFS rules.  r 
30 In  ow example, z must be larger than  1.12917 under PPRs, but it must only be larger than  0.616982 under 
FCFS rules. 
3'  In  ow example, total social surplus (as defmed by  the fm's expected profits) is .489619 under FCFS rules, 
while it is only .48367 under PPRs. 
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rules give each of them the same claim on the firm's  assets regardless of whether or not they monitor. 
With FCFS rules, lenders do have an incentive to monitor, since it gives them first call on the firm's assets 
in default. This reduces the interest rate needed to give lenders zero expected profits, letting the firm earn 
a higher return. 
Section IV - Delegated Monitor 
One might argue that FCFS rules result in excessive monitoring of the firm, since monitoring will 
generally  be  done by  more  than  one lender.  If  instead the lenders were  to  coordinate and name  a 
delegated monitor, total social costs might decline.  We show in this section that FCFS rules are preferred 
to both PPRs and APRs when a delegated monitor is selected. 
As  before, the firm needs to raise L to finance either project.  We will assume that the lender to 
whom the task of monitoring is delegated (henceforth called the "bank) loans the firm L,,  with the rest 
of the investment, L-LB = L,,  being provided by the n-1 non-monitoring ("public")  lenders.  Since the 
bank must be compensated for monitoring, the interest rate it receives will in general differ from that paid 
to the other lenders.  Let rB  be the interest rate received by the bank, and r,  the rate received by  all other 
lenders.  Then the total obligation of the firm is 
p  = rBLB  + rpLp.  (4.1) 
As before, the probability that the bank monitors in period two must be set so that the firm is indifferent 
between the two projects: 
The interest rate received by  public lenders is determined by  their zero-profit condition: 
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respectively. The definition of these functions is analogous to that in section 11.  5, is the expected return 
to public lenders when the firm chooses project B and is monitored by  the bank.  Under FCFS rules, 
public lenders are paid only after the bank receives its entire claim, while under PPRs, all of the firm's 
assets are divided equally among the lenders.  Thus, 
z -L, 
E,F=max{,O)  and  t,P=hpz,  (4.4) 
n-1 
where hp = Lp/(n-1)L  is the proportion of the total debt held by  an individual public lender.  Similarly, 
we will define h,  = L,/L  as the portion of the firm's total debt held by  the bank. 
The bank's interest rate and the probability that the firm chooses project B are determined by the 
simultaneous solution of the following two equations: 
(1%)~: +x:h  -C  -LB  =0,  (4.5) 
(1  9)  R,B  + x R,B  - L,  = 0.  (4.6) 
As  above, R:  and R;  are the bank's expected returns when projects G and B mature, respectively, and 
cB is the bank's return when it monitors a firm choosing project B.  Under FCFS rules, the bank receives 
all of the firm's assets in liquidation up to the value of its claim (5y  = min {z, L,)),  while under'PPRs, 
the assets are divided proportionately among all creditors (5r  = &  z). 
Total surplus is measured by  expected firm profit: 
Expected profit, and hence social welfare, will be increased whenever p is decreased.  Our goal is to show 
that p will be smaller under FCFS rules than it is under PPRs.  To do so, we consider a slightly simplified 
version of our model by assuming that the probability of default is unaffected by the interest rate paid to 
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THEOREM  3:  Total surplus is higher under FCFS  rules than it is under PPRs. 
Proof:  See appendix. 
COROLLARY:  Equilibrium is less likely to exist under PPRs than it is under FCFS  rules. 
Proof:  By Theorem 3, the firm's obligation is higher under PPRs.  n 
Theorem 3 shows that firm profit is higher under FCFS rules when the bank and public lenders 
have the same priority level.  The reason is that FCFS rules compensate the bank for performing its 
function as a monitor, thereby increasing the amount of this socially desirable activity. 
Naive intuition would suggest, then, that banks should be given absolute seniority over public 
debt.  This conclusion is incorrect.  Absolute seniority gives the bank first claim on the firm's assets in 
default, whether or not the bank performs  its monitoring  duties.  Paying the bank more regardless of its 
actions is no better, from a social welfare viewpoint, than using PPRs.  To see this, consider the following. 
Let project B take the value x  with probability p and -  x with probability (1-p). Project G, on the 
other hand, has a fixed return  of  (1-p)x  -  + p?.  We  will  assume that project G's expected return is 
32 Technically, increasing the payment to one lender increases the probability of  default, thereby reducing the 
expected return to all other lenders, holding constant the interest rate they receive.  Generally, this second-order effect 
is small and does not overwhelm those effects analyzed in the proof.  The assumption that the probability of default 
is unaffected by  small changes in  the interest rates avoids this problem and simplifies ow proofs.  Note that this 
assumption is satisfied for most discrete distributions. 
Under this assumption, it can also be shown that all previous propositions hold when the cost of default is 
a constant d.  In particular, Proposition 1 holds with no restriction on the size of d.  Although a constant d introduces 
a discontinuity into the payoff of the lender at the value of x where default just occurs, the assumption above ensures 
that no such x will be observed ex post, always making the lender prefer the less risky project. 
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chooses project B, it can meet its obligations only when the project is successful.  As above, we assume 
that the cost of state verification is fixed at d. 
Now the bank's expected return from monitoring is 
(I-rc)r,~,  + rccy  - c - L,,  (4.8) 
while the return from not monitoring is 
('-n)r,L,  + x[pr,L,  + (l-p)~,]  - L,,  (4.9) 
where y~,  is the bank's expected return when the firm defaults.  Under FCFS rules, this is h,  (&-d), and 
it is x-d  -  when the bank has strict seniority.33 
The public lenders' expected return is 
where yr, is the expected return to the public lender when project B is chosen, is allowed to continue, and 
fails.  Under FCFS rules  y~,  = h,  Q-d),  whereas  y~,  = 0 when the bank has strict seniority. 
We will now show that when they exist, the equilibrium under FCFS rules Pareto dominates the 
one with strict seniority. 
THEOREM  4:  Total surplus is larger under FCFS rules than it is when the bank has absolute priority. 
Proof:  We  will show that p is a continuous increasing function of  yr,.  Since y,  is higher under APRs, 
firm profit is lower. 
Continuity is immediate, so a discrete change in yr, can be viewed as the limit of a sequence of 
33 Note that if  2 -  d > rB  LB ,  the bank will receive only  rB  LB  . But  in this case, the bank  will never monitor, 
since the lowest possible outcome of  project B is still sufficient to repay the bank.  This can never be an equilibrium. 
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The change in the firm's obligation is 
Note that vp  = k-d-vB)l(n-l) , so dvpldvB  = -1 l(n-1)  < 0. In the proof of Theorem 3, we showed 
that  arBlaz  and  ar,la~  are both positive.  Using (4.9): 
Using (4.10): 
Combining these results proves dpldyB  > 0.  4 
COROLLARY:  Equilibrium is less likely to exist when the bank has absolute priority  over public  lenders 
than when FCFS rules are in efect. 
Proof:  By Theorem 4, the total obligation of  the firm is higher under APRs.  4 
With APRs, the problem is exactly the opposite of what it is under PPRs:  The bank is being paid 
too often.  The fact that the  bank receives first claim on the firm's  assets in bankruptcy  reduces its 
incentive to monitor.  As  a result, the firm chooses the riskier project more frequently, for whic6 lenders 
must be compensated with a higher interest rate. 
The lesson here is simple, but important:  In order to properly  align monitoring  incentives, the 
bankruptcy procedure should compensate a lender when and only when it monitors the borrower. 
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This paper has questioned the standard assumption that PPRs within each lender class and absolute 
priority among classes are always necessary in bankruptcy.  In our model, a moral hazard problem makes 
the act of monitoring a socially beneficial public good.  As  such, the total  cost of  debt contracting is 
reduced when the bankruptcy procedure compensates those  lenders who monitor a misbehaving firm. 
Allowing creditors to "run" on a financially distressed firm to retrieve their assets serves to implement just 
such a compensation mechanism. 
While  existing  bankruptcy  law  is  generally  believed  to  discourage  such  firm  runs,  many 
contractual arrangements do exist that allow lenders with superior information about a firm's prospects 
to retrieve their  assets before other creditors may  be aware of a problem.  We  now  look at two  such 
mechanisms. 
The model of section I1 closely resembles that of a retail firm with many suppliers.  Suppliers of 
retail outlets commonly provide them with trade credit.  These loans are typically renewed shortly after 
they are repaid as new merchandise is purchased by  the retailer.  However, a creditor may refuse to ship 
new supplies on credit if it perceives that the firm is in trouble.  Thus, the trade creditor looks much like 
a monitor from section 111.  By refusing to renew its loan, a trade creditor may force a troubled firm into 
bankruptcy earlier than it might otherwise have gone, preventing it from taking actions that would further 
weaken its financial condition. 
A prime example of this type of monitoring occurred in November 1991.  Heller Financial, Inc., 
a major factoring company for R.H. Macy & Co., announced that it would no longer guarantee payment 
for new goods shipped to the retailer. This announcement turned out to be the first of a series of pressures 
placed on Macy that ultimately resulted in its filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on January 27 
of  the next year.  Heller's announcement not only protected it from future losses, but also served as  a 
signal to the rest of the market that Macy's financial problems were becoming critical. 
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exercise when it discovers a borrower has breached a clause of its loan agreement.  If the bank observes 
some breech of the loan agreement, it can accelerate the loan and seize the borrower's deposits and other 
assets on account with the bank, thereby ensuring at least partial repayment.  This aspect of  the loan 
agreement looks much like the FCFS contracts considered in section IV.  Here, the bank is compensated 
when it does monitor the firm and detects a problem  early.  If  the bank is not diligent, however, the 
distressed firm will file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, thereby nullifying the right of setoff. 
An example of this type of situation occurred in April 1993 when Fidelity Bank, acting on behalf 
of a seven-bank group, seized NutriISystem, Inc.'s cash and bank accounts after restructuring talks broke 
down.  This seizure closed 283 of the company's outlets and led its franchisees to force the company into 
bankruptcy.  In addition, it forced NutriISystem's management to relinquish control to  a new  investor 
group.  As with R.H. Macy & Co., the action of Fidelity Bank not only compensated it for performing 
its monitoring duties, but also provided a socially valuable service by forcing NutriISystem to deal with 
its problems more quickly than it might otherwise have done. 
Clearly, these examples are the exception, not the rule, in dealing with financially distressed firms. 
But this fact supports our contention that these agreements are designed as incentive mechanisms.  If they 
are effective in preventing borrower misbehavior, then they shouldn't be exercised often. 
Nevertheless, inefficiencies still exist under all  of  the bankruptcy  rules in  our model.  Most 
notably, we have assumed that both projects have a positive net present value, so in a first-best world, 
both should be undertaken.  Debt in our model creates an underinvestment problem. This does not change 
the  fact, however,  that  FCFS  rules  are  more efficient than  the  other  bankruptcy  rules  considered. 
Furthermore, this underinvestment problem is not a necessary feature of our model.  All of our results can 
still be derived when the more risky project has a negative net present value, provided that the spread 
between the expected returns is sufficiently small. 
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should  be  reformed.  One  proposal  receiving  significant attention  is by  Aghion, Hart,  and  Moore 
(1992).~~  They suggest that each of a firm's creditors should be given an option to purchase the firm's 
assets from more senior claimants at the value  of  their claims.  This system would guarantee that a 
distressed firm's assets end up with the individual or group who values them most, and would ensure that 
economically viable firms will continue.  While this proposal would do much to eliminate the ex post 
inefficiencies associated with modem bankruptcy proceedings, it does not answer the basic concerns we 
address in this paper.  Like the PPRs and APRs we discuss above, their proposal does not consider the 
impact a proper compensation scheme can have on the probability that bankruptcy will occur in the first 
place. 
This model is not intended to suggest that existing bankruptcy rules should be discarded. Indeed, 
our results suggest that  some artifacts of  Chapter 11 generally viewed as undesirable may  in  reality 
provide some benefit.  In particular, the fact that junior claimants often maintain some value even when 
more senior claims are not paid  in full is often viewed  as a weakness of  the  law.  However, if  one 
assumes that those senior claimants involved in the collective proceeding are those who failed to monitor 
the debtor, social welfare is increased by failing to pay them the full value of their claims.35 
The main point we wish to emphasize in the debate over bankruptcy reform is that policymakers 
should consider the impact of  bankruptcy rules not only on the distribution of  a financially distressed 
firm's assets, but also on the terms of debt contracts.  It is this latter influence that has the largest effect 
on social welfare. 
34 See also Roe (1983) and Bebchuk (1988). 
35 Some recent papers have demonstrated that deviations from absolute priority may  be  welfare improving ex 
ante.  See Harris and Raviv (1993) and Eberhart and Senbet (1993). 
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Proof of PROPOSITION  1:  First consider the effect of a change in the interest rate on the lender's expected 
retum from any arbitrary project F: 
Thus, if  d < [I  -F(rL)]  If (rL)  ,  this derivative will be positive, meaning that an increase in the interest rate 
raises the lender's  expected retum.  This  provides the required  upper bound  for d.  In  general, this 
relationship is ambiguous, since an increase in the interest rate will also increase the probability of default. 
Let RB(rJ denote the lender's expected return if project B  is chosen with interest rate  r,,  and 
similarly for R,(r,).  Now  lenders have a "utility"  function of the following form: 
u(x) = min { x -d(rL  -x)  rL 
,  -1, 
which is a weakly concave, weakly increasing function.  But any agent with such a utility function must 
have RB(r,) < R,(r,)  by second-order stochastic dominance, so the zero-profit interest rate for project B 
must be greater than r,.  n 
Proof of PROPOSITION  2:  We wish to show that the difference between the expected profit from project 
B and the expected profit from project G is positive.  This difference is 
where y is the total payment promised in period three.  Integrating by parts, we see that this equals 
Now, the condition of equal means, 
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This implies 
Now, the expression on the right is positive because G is less risky than B.  But the expression on the left 
is equation (A4), the value to the firm of  choosing project B over project G.  rcr 
Proof of PROPOSITION  3:  In the text, we derived the equilibrium probability of monitoring, the probability 
of choosing the more risky project, and the zero-profit interest rate.  Here we have only to show that no 
agent will wish to deviate from his proposed equilibrium strategy. 
(1) After observing the more risky project B, a lender who monitors might still wish to renew the 
loan.  This will not be  the case if  the expected return from rolling over the debt is less than that from 
foreclosing.  Under FCFS rules, this requirement is 
The left-hand side is the expected return from foreclosing on the loan and depends upon the number of 
other lenders who monitor:  If the period-two value of the firm is sufficient to pay off all monitors, each 
receives Lln; otherwise, the assets are divided equally among them.  The right-hand side represents the 
expected return from rolling over the debt.  If  no other lender monitors, the  firm  continues and the 
lender's expected return is RB(r). Otherwise, the firm is liquidated and the lender receives some of the 
firm's assets only if all other monitors are paid in full. 
29 
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n  w+l 
its smallest value when w  = n-1 ,  and z  < L by assumption. Thus, this inequality will always be satisfied 
Z  whenever its right-hand side is less than  -.  Cross-multiplying by  n gives us a lower bound for z: 
n 
A similar lower bound can be derived under PPRs: 
(2) A lender might refuse to renew the loan even after observing project G.  This is a suboptimal 
strategy under both types of bankruptcy rules as long as36 
Since the firm has chosen project G, no other lenders foreclose.  Thus, the left-hand side is the payment 
to a lender who deviates from equilibrium.  The right-hand side is the expected return to a monitor who 
renews the loan.  Clearly, Lln is an upper bound for the left-hand side of this inequality.  It is also a lower 
bound  for the right-hand side, since  rs 1  r,,  the interest rate  that ensures  R,(r)  = Lln.  Thus, this 
inequality will always hold. 
(3) A lender might wish to foreclose when it does not monitor.  This will not be the case if the 
expected return from foreclosing, 
is less than the expected return from rolling over the debt, 
36 Technically, the condition under PPRs is min  { zln, Lln } I  R,(rs).  But since zln < z, the above condition 
is sufficient for both rules. 
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Now the first term in (A12)  is clearly less than (1-xs)L/n. Furthermore, the second term is less 
ZL  L  L  than xsL/n,  since min {-,-I  I -.  Thus, -  provides an upper bound on (A12). But (A13)  must 
w+1  n  n  n 
equal Lln, since rs and xs solve (2.12)  equal to zero in equilibrium.  This ensures that this inequality will 
always be satisfied. 
(4)  The firm might try to refinance its loans using outside lenders in period two.  Regardless of 
the project chosen, however, outside lenders assume that the firm has  selected project B,  so the best 
interest rate they will accept is r,.  This, by  assumption, gives the firm non-positive profits.  Thus, no 
firm will wish to deviate in this manner.  r 
Proof of  THEOREM  1:  Rewriting (3.2) and (3.3)  from the text: 
L  (1  -+)R,(r)  + +tl(r) = c  + -  , 
n 
It is easy to show that 
L  RG(r) 1 c  + - 1  tl(r) 
n 
and 
ensuring that + E  [O,  I]. 
We can solve (A14) and (A15)  for + as functions of the interest rate: 
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nl(r) =  ,  n2(r) = 
RG(~)  - 51(r> 
(A 18) 
RG(r) - (l-ay-lRB(r)  - &(r) 
The intersections of these two functions will give us (n, r) pairs that simultaneously solve (2.8) and (2.12) 
equal to zero.  If these curves intersect more than once, the first such intersection is the candidate for 
equilibrium, since it entails the lowest interest rate. 
Now, xl(r) = 0 when r  = rm  = R~'(c+~ln),  and n2(r) = 0 when r  = r,  = RE'(L/~).  As r gets 
larger, these must enter the positive orthant, since n  is a convex weight.  Clearly,  ny  min~rizes~~ 
ICY,  since Lln L zln and z/(w+l) 2 zln for all  w 2 n-1,  and  majorizes ny,  since 
z-wL1n  < l,  v we  11  ,..., n-1). 
n-w  n 
(A19) 
But this implies that the first intersection of  ny  and  ny  must lie to the right of the first intersection 
of  and  (see figure 2 in the text).  Compared to FCFS rules, then, PPRs must entail a higher 
interest rate.  4 
Proof of THEOREM  3:  Starting from PPRs and switching to FCFS rules, let d5,  denote change in the 
bank's expected return when it monitors a firm that chooses project B: 
d5,  =  min  {z,  L,)  - h,  z  >  0.  (A20) 
(This must be positive, since h,  < 1 and z < L).  Rewrite p as 
~(5,)  = r,(5,)  L,  + rp(5,)  Lp  .  (A21) 
We will show that  p(5,)  is a continuous decreasing function, meaning that the switch to FCFS rules 
reduces p; this reduction increases firm profit and, hence, social surplus. 
Continuity  is immediate.  This  means that the  impact  of  the  discrete change  in  5,  can be 
calculated using a sequence of  infinitesimal changes. 
37  That is, for  every r, ny(r)  < np"(r). Similarly, the  phrase fl  majorizes ny  means that  ny(r)  > 
ny(r),  V r. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe change in the firm's total obligation is 
To simplify this expression, we derive each of  its terms.  Note that 5,  = (z<,)/(n-1),  which implies 
dcp/dcB  = -1 /(n-1).  Using (4.6), we get: 
Following the same argument we used in the proof of Theorem 1, we can see that drB/dcB  < 0. 
From (4.5) and (4.6), we can calculate 
B  RG  - c - LB  R~~ - L~ 
nl(rB) =  and  xz(rB) = 
R,B  - 5s  R,B  - R~~ ' 
respectively.  As before, the r that causes  K,  = 0  is larger than the r making nZ = 0, meaning that for 
every  r < r *  (the equilibrium interest rate, if  it exists), .n,(r) < .n,(r).  Now  an increase in  cB causes 
.n,(r) to be larger for every r.  As a consequence, the first intersection of  K,  and x2 moves to the left as 
cB increases; i.e., 
calculating this derivative using (4.5). 
Finally, (4.3) allows us to calculate: 
and 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmarp an  drs  <  O, so  We now use these expressions to simplify and sign dp. First, note that --  a~  arBdS, 
Substituting: 
where  G(p)  is the distribution of the good project evaluated at p.  R, 
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